Beyond the 'Intellectual Hygiene': Why Banning Governance Clichés Isn't Enough

Update: This is a critique of this author's article and an exploration of why diagnosing African political culture with "cliché lists" often just replaces one set of simplifications with another

There is a certain purity to the intellectual impulse. When an observer identifies a set of "thought-terminating clichés," there is an allure to them: If I can name them, I can purge the language from their grip. This sentiment was the driving force behind a recent collection of ten platitudes on African governance that demands their end. The author argues that terms like "Africa has a leadership problem" or "Corruption is the main obstacle" are not just inaccuracies; they are tools of simplification that serve international bureaucracies rather than African realities.

The piece is undeniably sharp in its diagnosis. It correctly identifies that governance discourse is often too comfortable with morality and too reluctant with power. However, there is a risk inherent in any "cleanse the discourse" exercise: that while we identify the symptoms of bad talk, we often don't fully understand why those symptoms exist—or, worse, that we replace them with another set of invisible rules.

To say these clichés "need to die" implies they are merely obstacles on a straight path toward clarity. In reality, they are symptoms of a deeper structural tension.

Here is why we need to be cautious about the "intellectual hygiene" approach to African political economy.

1. The Utility of the Cliché

The author argues that "leadership problem" is the single most popular cliché because it allows people to criticize leaders without interrogating systems. But the utility of the phrase isn't solely for the benefit of donors; it is often a survival mechanism for African actors.

When African citizens use "the problem is leadership" to describe a failing president, they are not always engaging in intellectual hygiene. They are often engaging in political containment. In a context where structural analysis might be too complex or dangerous to articulate publicly, the language of leadership is a way to focus public attention without triggering the very mechanisms that would shut it down (e.g., discussing "state capacity" invites technocratic intervention).

By insisting that these phrases "need to die," the author implicitly assumes that the current political discourse is solely about the "good" vs. the "bad" leader. But in many African states, "leadership" is the language used by both the opposition and the state to claim moral high ground. If we ban the phrase, does the analysis become more honest, or does it just shift the burden to the next acceptable metaphor?

2. The "IMF/World Bank" Problem

The critique of the "According to the World Bank / IMF said" cliché is powerful. It correctly identifies that these institutions are political actors selling a neoliberal model. However, the author's solution—treating them as "advice among many" rather than "economic high priests"—remains stuck within the framework of Western governance.

The author correctly notes that successful developmental states didn't obey the Washington Consensus diktats. But the real problem isn't the institutions; it's the implied hierarchy they impose. By treating the IMF and World Bank as the "problem," the author risks framing the conflict as "African Agency vs. External Control."

This overlooks the internal agency of African elites who often embrace these frameworks for their own political gain. The cliché isn't just about listening; it's about legitimacy. If an African president says, "The IMF said we must cut subsidies," it provides them with immediate political cover. It removes them from the blame for unpopular decisions. To "kill" this cliché is to strip African leaders of their most potent shield against public outcry.

If we move too quickly to reject these phrases, we risk making African leaders look like the ones who "failed" to implement the reforms they wanted. The real question is how to navigate the tension between external technical requirements and domestic political realities, not how to discard the technical requirements themselves.

3. "Power" vs. "Governance"

The author concludes with a compelling call to action: stop speaking of governance while avoiding the harder, older, and more uncomfortable word: power.

This is the most important part of the critique, yet it is also the most dangerous. "Governance" is often a euphemism for "management." But "Power" is not just a noun we need to introduce; it is a verb we need to use.

The issue is that even in this final paragraph, the author continues to operate within a Western paradigm of "governance." If we replace "corruption" with "rent-seeking," or "leadership failure" with "state capacity," we are still playing a game that Western donors can play the same.

The author suggests that African societies are "less intelligible" because of these clichés. But they aren't less intelligible because of bad words; they are less intelligible because of opaque power structures. By focusing on the language, the author risks treating power itself as a problem to be solved, rather than the central object of analysis.

We don't need to "die" the clichés to see the power dynamics at work. We need to stop trying to diagnose the language in order to understand the political economy that produces it.

4. The "Agency vs. Structure" Paradox

The piece is haunted by its own paradox: it calls out structural explanations (colonial legacies, extraction) while focusing heavily on agency ("political will," "strong leadership").

In point 3, the author argues that "corruption" is a symptom of political order. In point 1, the author argues that "leadership" is a moral problem. These are not mutually exclusive, but when you present them this way, you inadvertently keep the structure alive.

If corruption is a symptom of political order, then the "political order" is the thing that needs to be fixed. But if the "political order" is itself defined by "strong institutions" and "private sector efficiency" (points 7 and 8), then the critique is circular. The author calls out the clichés, but the framework for analyzing the solutions often remains the same.

5. Toward a New Language, Not Just an Old One

The author's conclusion that these clichés are useful for making African societies "legible to international bureaucracies" is accurate. The problem isn't just that African people use these clichés; it's that the international community wants them.

So, a "cleanse" might feel like a moral imperative, but it risks being a colonial linguistic project. It assumes that the "clean" language of development is the right kind of language, and the "cliché" language of power is the wrong kind.

The real move forward isn't just a list of things to stop saying. It is about developing a language that can describe power without making it a problem for the donor. It requires moving beyond the binary of "corruption vs. integrity" or "technocracy vs. strongmen."

Instead, we need a vocabulary that speaks to structural incentives.

• Instead of "political will," talk about competing coalitions.
• Instead of "leadership problem," talk about state formation failure.
• Instead of "corruption," talk about extraction rents.

But the danger is that even this vocabulary will just be another "correct answer" waiting to be deployed by the next consultant.

Conclusion: Intellectual Hygiene Is a Luxury

There is a luxury in intellectual hygiene. You can clean up a room only if you have the power to enter it. The author's call for a small act of intellectual hygiene is a valid starting point, but it is also a starting point that may be too small to change the landscape.

We don't need to ban these clichés to see the power structures at work. We need to stop pretending that African governance is just a technical problem waiting to be solved. That is the cliché that needs to die, not the specific ones listed, but the belief that governance can be separated from history, and that politics can be simplified into a management problem.

The challenge isn't to stop saying these phrases; it's to stop thinking they are the only way to talk about them. We need to be ready to talk about power, yes. But we also need to be ready to talk about power without apologizing for the language we use to describe it.